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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

----------------------------- --------------------1:1,u·· DUL, Guardian ad Litem
;, r .1M;f DUL,
Plc1ntift-Appellant,
-',/-

v.

Case No. 19061

ARGUELLES, et al.,

Deiendants-Petitioners.

Petitioners, State of Utah and Ronald Stromberg hereby
subro-.1t the following Petition for Rehearing to the Supreme Court
of tne State of Utah.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Whether this Court improperly addressed issues not

1.

to the trial court or briefed on appeal.
2.

Whether this Court overlooked the far-reaching and

certain impact which its decision will have on the discretionary
fJ:1ct1on exception of the Governmental Immunity Act.
STATEMENT OF THE CA5E
The Tnird District Court, the Honorable Philip R.
presiding, granted the state defendants' motion for

i1;:,tilu

'"·"r] luayment on the following grounds:
The decision to release the defendant Roberto

1.
'· '. l,
1

1 r urr1 the Youth Development Center

(hereafter YDCJ was a

11•ncJ r/ function for which the state defendants are immune

r:.u1L;

ctnd

2.

The decision to release the defendant Roberto

'· • ··

ii

urr. the YDC was a quasi-Judicial function for which

' 1·1

defendants are immune from suit.

(A copy of the Order is attached as Appendix A).
The plaintiff appealed from the judgment of the Third
District Court and in Doe y. Arguelles, No. 19061 (Utah, Decembet
27, 1985), this Court affirmed that portion of the trial court's
ruling which held that the decision to release Roberto Arguelles
from the YDC was a discretionary function and therefore, the
state defendants were immune from suit.

However, this Court went

on to find that the implementation of the release decision was
ministerial in nature and therefore, the defendants were not
immune from suit under the discretionary function exception.

(A

copy of the full opinion is attached as Appendix Bl.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Petitioners hereby incorporate by reference the
statement of facts contained in Respondents' Brief,
(Respondents' Brief, pp. 1-18).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
provides that a petition for rehearing "shall state with
particularity the points of law or fact which the Court has
overlooked or misapprehended."

In Cu!!®ings v. Nielson, 42 Utah

157, 129 P. 619 <1913), this Court stated:
•.• a rehearing should not be applied for,
unless we have misconstrued or overlooked
some material fact or facts, or have
overlooked some statute or decision which may
affect the result, or that we have based the
decision on some wrong principle of law, or
have either misapplied or overlooked
something which materially affects the
result. .•.
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4; Utah at 172-173,

129 P. at 624.

These authorities establish

"'"ta petition for rehearing should be granted where the
,ctit1uner has identified a specific point of law or issue of
tact which the Court has neglected or misconstrued or which
r,aterially affects the outcome of the case.

Petitioners submit

in the present case, this Court overlooked a basic principle
o! 1udicial review and addressed issues which were not properly
bet ore the Court on appeal.

In so doing, the Court failed to

consider the dramatic affect which its decision will have on the
Ctall Governmental Immunity Act and on governmental programs

generally.

Petitioners submit that these omissions satisfy the

rigorous standard established by this Court for granting a
for rehearing and that said petition is properly before
the Court and should be granted.
ARGUMENT
POINT I

THIS COURT IMPROPERLY CONSIDERED ISSUES WHICH
WERE NOT PRESENTED TO THE TRIAL COURT OR
BRIEFED BY THE PARTIES ON APPEAL.
It is a fundamental principle of appellate review tnat
issues not contained in the record shall not be considered for
the first time on appeal.

Corbet y.

Corbet, 472 P.2d 430 (Utah

19701; Reliable Furniture Co. y, Fidelity & Guaranty Insurance
l.l.nderwr1ters.

Inc., 14 Utah 2d 169, 380 P.2d 135 (Utah 1963) •

In the context of a motion for summary judgment, the
rr1al

r_r"at should be accorded the first opportunity to rule upon

ues ctnd theories advanced by the 1 itigants.
11

Issues which were

ut ,,1esented to nor ruled upon by the trial court in granting a
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summary judgment cannot be raised by the parties for thE: first
time on appeal to secure reversal of the judgment.

Nielson vL

Vashon Island School District No. 402, 558 P.2d 167 (Wash. 19761;
Crook v. Anderson, 565 P.2d 908 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977).
This Court has repeatedly held that it will not
consider points and contentions not raised in the trial court.
State y, Theison, 19 U.A.R. 14, No. 20598 (Utah, Sept. 26, 1985).
Yet in the present case, this Court has done the very thing which
it forbids litigants to do.
In the Arguelles decision, this Court concluded that
defendant, Ronald Stromberg's "decision to place Arguelles fell
into the category of functions designed to be shielded under the
discretionary function exception, and his decision should not be
questioned in a court of law."

Arguelles at p. 3.

This issue

was the only issue properly before this Court on appeal.
However, the Court's opinion does not end there.

The Court went

on to hold that if the plaintitf's ward's inJuries were
proximately caused by Stromberg's "negligence in monitoring the
prescribed treatment" after making the discretionary decision to
release Arguelles, he would not be immune from suit under the
discretionary function exception.

Arguelles at p. 4.

This point

of law was never raised by the pleadings, in discovery or in the
legal arguments advanced by the parties.

The first time that the

issue was ever raised by plaintift was in her Reply Brief on
appeal.
Even a cursory review of the trial court record
evidences the fact that plaintitf's theory of liability did not

-4-

iide negligent implementation of

the release decision .

..,'"Lilt's complaint alleges that the YDC was charged with the
cr1,nc.ibility of confinement,

treatment and rehabilitation of

tne defendant Roberto Arguelles.

(R. 4l.

The complaint further

aJ!eges that defendants, Ron Stromberg, Ralph Garn, Russ Vanvleet
and Jeff McBride, who were employees of the YDC, were responsible
tor Arguelles'

confinement,

treatment and release.

(R. 4).

The

complaint then alleges that the conduct of these employees as it
related to the conf inernent, treatment and decision to release
anO/O[

parole Roberto Arguelles was negligent, grossly negligent

and in reckless disregard for the lives and safety of plaintiff's
ward and other members of the public.

(R. 4-6).

Thus, from the

outset of this lawsuit, plaintiff's theory was that the employees
of tne YDC did not properly rehabilitate Arguelles while he was
·cnf1ned at the YDC and therefore,
•a5 unreasonable.

the decision to release him

Plaintiff never alleged that the supervision

·r Arguelles after his release was negligent or was the proximate
cause of

plaintiff's injuries.
The extensive discovery conducted during this case

tJrtnu substantiates petitioner's claim.
'l

The record is

tuaJ ly devoid of any discovery which indicates the manner in
cl1

thE. release decision was implemented.

Plaintiff deposed

'.'r,Junts Stromberg, Garn and Vanvleet, all YDC officials and
.,cue, who consistently testified that the responsibility for
1

'1len1ent1ng the release decision rested with the parole officer.

''>c test1m0ny of these witnesses also specifically identified the
c cit f icer assigned to Roberto Arguelles and identified the
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parole officer's two immediate supervisors.

(See Deposition of

Ron Stromberg, pp. 71-73; Deposition of Ralph Garn, pp. 44-45;
Deposition of Russell Vanvleet,

p. 51, copies of those portions

of the depositions are attached as Appendix Cl.

Yet,

interestingly enough, none ot these individuals were ever named
as defendants in the complaint or deposed by the plaintiff during
the lengthy discovery process.

Thus,

there is absolutely no

testimony on the record from anyone who had personal knowledge of
how the release decision was actually implemented.
This omission from the record is significant for two
reasons.

First,

it establishes conclusively that the question of

negligent post-release supervision was not at issue in the case.
Second, without any evidence on the record as to the
specific activities which the parole officer performed, it is
impossible for this Court to determine as a matter of law that
implementation of the release decision was ministerial in nature.
The availability of immunity does not depend on the formal
description of the official's activities or the importance of the
position held by a public official, but rather on the tunctional
nature of the activities which that official performs.
Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978).

Butz y.

Numerous state and federal

jurisdictions have extended the doctrines of discretionary
function and quasi-Judicial immunity to a variety of activities
performed by probation and parole officers even when those
activities did not involve a release decision.
County of Alameda, 614 P.2d 728

y.

(Cal. 1980) (post-release super-

vision constitutes a discretionary function); Larson y. Dartnell 1
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448 N.w.2d

249 <Ill.App.Ct. 1983) (parole supervision held to be a

discrdionary function); Trotter v. Klincar, 748 F.2d 1177 (7th
,: 1 , .

1984) <participation in a parole revocation procedure held to

De d

quasi-Judicial function); and Hall y. Schaeffer, 556 F.Supp.

539 1£.D.

Penn. 1983) (request by a parole officer for issuance ot

a warrant is a quasi-judicial function).
This Court presumably attempted to overcome this
deficiency in the record by assuming that because the YDC had
legal custody of students who had been discharged from the
school, the YDC and its employees were responsible for
supervising the students upon their release.
4J.

(Arguelles at p.

However, at the time Arguelles was released from the YDC,

tne controlling legislation provided that a student at the YDC
may be conditionally released from residency within the center to
live outside the center "under the supervision of an officer of

tne center or other person designated by the superintendent .•.. "

!Emphasis added).

Utah Code Ann.

§

64-6-1.1.

Another section of

the act entitled "Community Placements" provided that students

placed in the community would remain in the legal custody of and
under the supervision of the Division of Family Services.
Code Ann.

§

At-['endix D).

64-6-10.

Utah

(A copy of these statutes are attached as

In the present case, Stromberg, as the

s.per1ntendent of the YDC and in accordance with applicable law,
lle!eqated responsibility for Arguelles' supervision in the
l-0""""rn1r_y

to a parole officer.

'"

the direction of the Division of Family Services not

'lndu

U,c \'DC,

The parole staff, at that time,

The Division of Family Services, by statute, had legal
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responsibility for supervising youth in community placements.
Therefore, the Court's assumption that Stromberg was responsible
for post-release supervision is not supported by the controlliny
legislation at that time.
Moreover, this conclusion reflects a basic
misunderstanding of the operation of the criminal and juvenile
justice systems.

In Utah, the state courts, by statute, have

legal custody of probationers. Utah Code Ann.

§

77-18-1111.

The

courts retain jurisdiction over probationers and have the
authority and power to issue warrants for the arrest and
detention of any probationer who violates the conditions of
probation.

Yet, the court is not legally responsible for

implementing the release decision or ensuring that a probationer
complies with the conditions ot his release.

That responsibility

is delegated to the Department of Corrections' probation office.
Similarly, the Board of Pardons has legal
responsibility for establishing when and under what conditions
inmates at the Utah State Prison are released on parole.
Code Ann.

§

77-27-5.

Utah

The Board retains jurisdiction over

parolees once released and has the power and authority to issue
warrants for their arrest and detention when they violate the
terms of their conditional release.

Utah Code Ann. §77-27-1113).

Yet the Board has neither the ability or authority to "implement"
its release decisions.

The responsibility for parole supervision

ha"s been delegated to the Department of Corrections.
Accordingly, in Arguelles, the mere fact that the YDC
haa legal custody of and retained Jurisdiction over a student who

-8-

tiarl been released from

the school, did not establish legal

"oof!''nsibility for supervision of that student after release.
record evidences that, even though the YDC, like the courts
1"

0 the lloard of Pardons had the ability to issue process for the

airest and detention of individuals who violated the terms of
their

conditional release, the YDC was entirely dependent on the

parole staff to report any violations and to implement the
conditions of release.

Thus, this Court's determination that

defendant Stromberg was responsible for implementing release
does not comport with the applicable legislation or the
facts contained in the record.

Rather, the law and the facts

establish that Stromberg was not legally responsible for
implementing the release decision and that the conduct of those
who were responsible was never before the trial court and
theretore, improperly considered by this Court.
Finally, the legal arguments advanced by both parties
at the trial court level and on appeal establish that the only
issue properly before this Court for resolution under the Govern"'ental Immunity Act was whether the decision to release Arguelles
irorr, the YDC was a discretionary function.

Defendants' memoran-

durr, in support of their Motion for Summary Judgment states:
Thus, the only real issue was whether the
decision to release Roberto Arguelles on
December 19, 1979 was proper.
1P.

Plaintiff's memorandum in opposition to defendants'

Mct1on for Summary Judgment identifies the same issue.

(R. 314).

At the oral argument in district court on defendants'
"L1un fvr summary Judgment,

both parties agreed that the issue
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before the Court was whether the decision to release Arguelles
from the YDC was a discretionary function (R. 339, 412).
Plaintiff did not advance nor was there any discussion
the theory that the defendants' supervision ot Arguelles after
his release was ministerial.

No legal authority was cited in

support of or contrary to such a theory.
On appeal, the docketing statement submitted by
plaintiff and on file with this Court identif ieo the only issue
for resolution under the Governmental Immunity Act as follows:
a. Whether or not Judge Philip R.
Fishler was correct in ruling as a matter of
law that the decision of Ronald Stromberg,
individually and on behalf of the Utah State
YDC, to release defendant Roberto Arguelles
from YDC was a discretionary function and,
therefore, would have immunity from suit
pursuant to u.s.c. § 63-30-10(1) ; •••.
Finally, as evidenced by the briefs on file with this
Court, the sole issue presented for resolution under the
Governmental Immunity Act was whether the decision to release
Arguelles was a discretionary function;

Not whether the

implementation of that decision was a discretionary function.
(See Appellant's brief, pp. 25-32 and Respondents' brief, pp. 1827).

Neither party submitted the issue of post-release

supervision to this Court in their original briefs.

Nor did the

parties cite any legal authority in support of or contrary to
that theory, despite the wealth of instructive case law which
exists on this issue.

It was not until the plaintiff filed her

Reply Brief on appeal that the issue of post-release supervision
was raised.

Thus, even though neither the trial court nor the

defendants had the opportunity to address the issue, the Court's
decision turned on this single

-10-

Petitioners submit that given the existing record in
case and the fact that neither the trial court or the

r.is
11

tPn<iants had the opportunity to address the issue upon which
case was ultimately decided, this Court should affirm the

1 1,1s

summary Judgment on the issues presented by the parties or
alternatively, grant petitioners'

request for a rehearing to

f'Jlly brief and argue the question of whether post-release

superv1s1on in this case was a ministerial act.
POINT II
THE DECISION IN ARGUELLES EFFECTIVELY
ELIMINATES APPLICATION OF THE DISCRETIONARY
FUNCTION EXCEPTION TO ALL GOVERNMENTAL
ACTIVITIES, CONTRARY TO THE INTENT AND
PURPOSE OF THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY
ACT.
When courts take it upon themselves to raise, argue and
decide legal questions not addressed by the parties,

overlooking important facts,

they risk

legal considerations and practical

consequences which may result from a decision rendered without
brnef it of a complete record and thorough briefing.

See

of Human Services y, Tapia, 642 P.2d 1091 (N.W.
ln2J.

As petitioners set forth above, this Court's decision in

ArgJelles turned on a point of law not addressed by the parties.
£y gc•ing outside of
:Le

peirt1es,

irnv"

t

'•;'ttt
ilect
-'

1

the record and beyond the briefs submitted by

this Court overlooked the devastating and certain

its decis1or, would have on the discretionary function
_1,11

Ile

oi the Utah Governmental Immunity Act and the practical
aec 1 s 1 on would have on the many and varied operations

•.tatc and local government.
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In Arguelles, this Court held that Stromberg's decision
to release Arguelles from the YDC was discretionary and therefore
he was immune from suit.

This Court also held that Stromberg's

implementation of his own discretionary decision was ministerial,
and that he was not entitled to immunity on that basis:
Because a probation
decisions are discretionary, he is immune
from suit arising from those decisions.
However, his acts
the
must be considered on a case-by-case basis to
determine whether they are ministerial and
thereby outside the immunity protections.
Arguelles at 4 (emphasis added).

Thus, individuals responsible

for decision-making at the policy level may make a decision and
be immune from suit, but cannot implement that decision without
being potentially liable.

This Court thus holds that a

government officer's thought processes are protected from suit.
He (or she) may ponder, ruminate, consider, evaluate, and come to
a decision, write it down or discuss it with colleagues and in
committees, without fear of liability because the discretionary
function exception of the Utah Governmental Irr,muni ty Act
(§

63-30-10 ( 1) (a)), protects the decision,

the decision-maker and

the decision-making process.
Yet, Arguelles also holds that as soon as the decisionmaker attempts to implement that rolicy decision, its
discretionary characteristics disappear.

The thought turns to

action, the action becomes ministerial in 11ature and immunity is
gone.

(Arguelles at 5).

In Stromberg's case, he could

release Arguelles and be immune from suit but he could not
release Arguelles and retain immunity.
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to

This result is, of course, absurd.

To hold, as this

:curt has in Arguelles, that a policy-maker is immune from suit
ic.•

ti1e

thought processes involved in the making of a decision,

:,,t t11at the same individual can be liable for the implementation

1

of that decision,

is to effectively eliminate any application of

governmel!tal immunity for discretionary function.

No decision,

policy, or thought process, in and of itself, ever caused injury
or daruage to a potential plaintiff.

It is through active

1mr·lementation of a policy or decision that inJury may result.
Every discretionary decision, unless it forever remains
aormant and is never implemented or acted upon, will become
n1nisterial at the time of implementation, and, at that time,
according to this Court 1 s holding in Arguelles, the immunity,
which attached at the decision-making stage, disappears.

All a

need do in a suit against a governmental entity to
avoid application of the statute and defeat a summary judgment in
fovur uf the governmental entity, is to plead that a governmental
ott1cial, no matter his rank, implemented a decision, policy or
Objective, and that the imi:-lementation was negligent.

By doing

so, plaintiff would effectively thwart the immunity protections

of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.

Consequently, the law as

1t telates to the discretionary activities of government would
11:n:c. no ef tect,

and would be, for all intents and purposes, null

-13-

This result is contrary to recent pronouncements from
the United States Supreme Court.

(See United States v. S.A.

de Viacao Area Rio Grandense, 104 S.Ct. 2755, 2765-69
(1984), interpreting the discretionary function exception of the

Federal Tort Claims Act).

An interpretation that this Court has

stated on numerous occasions it would follow.

See Little v.

State Division of Family Services, 667 P.2d 49, 51 (Utah 1983);
Frank v. State, 613 P. 2d 517, 519 (Utah 1980).
This result is also contrary to the obvious intent of
the state legislature.

The legislature enacted the discretionary

function exception within the Governmental Immunity Act for a
purpose.

After Arguelles, the exception has no purpose.

As the

legislature enacted it, the discretionary function exception has
meaning, function and a long history of application and
interpretation in federal courts, in other state Jurisdictions,
and in Utah.

This Court is required by its own edict to give

force and effect to "every word and phrase" of a statutory
provision.

Board of Education of Carbon County School District

v. Bryner, 57 Utah 78, 192 P. 627 (Utah 1920),
Arguelles does Just the opposite.

The decision in

In emasculates the

robs it of any force and effect, and

its practical

application in every conceivable case where plaintiff properly
pleads allegations of negligent implementation of policy.

In

effect, this Court has repealed the discretionary function
ex()eption of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.
legislative act by the Court violates Article v,
Constitution.

This
§

1 of the Utan

The state legislature enacted the discretionary

-14-

10 r,rt1c•n

exception and this Court has no authority to repeal it
without declaring it unconstitutional.

No such

cieclaration is found in Arguelles nor could this Court have
11 , 1ended

such a result when it unanimously decided Arguelles.
must be given to the far-reaching and drastic

of the decision.

This issue is too important to be

summarily treated without benefit of a thorough examination of
tre legal issues involved and the policy considerations at stake.
CONCLUSION
In Doe y. Arguelles, this Court decided a significant
legal issue which had not been presented by the pleadings, the
record or the arguments on appeal.

The resolution of this issue

effectively eliminated the force and effect of the discretionary
tunct10n exception of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.

Such a

d;astic result should not attain from issues never properly
adaressed before either the District or Supreme Court.
Tt1erefore, petitioners respectfully request that this Court
affirm tne summary

judgment on the issues presented by the

or alternatively, grant petitioners' application for
fEJ,ear ing.
Dated this

'OtVi

day of January, 1986.
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General

CARLIE CHRISTENSEN
Assistant Attorney General
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